Comentario al artículo de E. Tourinho: "O pensar: Comportamento social e práticas culturais"

Full reference: Ruiz, F. J. (2012). Comentario al artículo de E. Tourinho: "O pensar: Comportamento social e práticas culturais" [Comment on E. Tourinho's article: "Thinking: Social behavior and cultural practices"]. Acta Comportamentalia, 20(Monográfico), 118.

Type of work: Commentary (Theoretical response article to a conceptual proposal)

Central thesis and objectives

Francisco J. Ruiz presents a critical commentary on Eleno Tourinho's article concerning thinking from a functional-analytic perspective centered on the analysis of cultural practices. Ruiz's purpose is to conduct a constructive critique that identifies both the correct and problematic aspects of Tourinho's proposal. Ruiz acknowledges substantial points of agreement with Tourinho, especially his rejection of dualism and epistemological individualism, as well as his premise that cognition must be studied as a relational phenomenon that emerges from multiple social interactions. However, Ruiz disagrees on important methodological and sequential aspects regarding how the analysis of thinking should be approached.

Ruiz's central thesis is that although Tourinho's proposal to analyze cultural practices is promising, the absence of a precise functional definition of thinking makes it difficult to proceed systematically in the metacontingential analysis that Tourinho proposes. Ruiz maintains that it is necessary to begin with a clear functional definition based on Relational Frame Theory before one can adequately analyze the cultural practices that underlie thinking.

Theoretical framework

Ruiz situates his analysis within a framework that integrates three fundamental research programs. First, Skinner's verbal behavior (1957), which provides a basis for understanding how language emerges in the interaction between organism and environment. Second, derived relational behavior (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche, 2001; Sidman, 1994), which offers mechanisms to explain how equivalent and derived relations are established. Third, cultural selection (Glenn, 2004), which provides a framework for understanding how practices are maintained and evolve at the cultural level.

Ruiz's theoretical framework emphasizes that these three programs must be integrated, not opposed to one another. Relational Frame Theory (RFT), in particular, provides what Ruiz considers a precise functional definition of language and cognition that allows for analysis of the basic behavioral processes involved. Ruiz conceptualizes thinking as a form of relational behavior that emerges from the individual's history of interactions and the cultural practices that surround him.

Argument development

Ruiz develops his argument through an analysis of agreements and disagreements with Tourinho. First, he underscores that he completely agrees with Tourinho's critique of epistemological dualism. Both authors reject the notion that there exists a mind separate from the body or a cognition divorced from observable behavior. Ruiz also agrees that cognition is necessarily a relational phenomenon that arises from multiple social interactions, not an isolated individual property.

However, Ruiz presents his main disagreement over the starting point of an analysis of thinking. Tourinho proposes initially emphasizing the metacontingencies involved in the behavior of thinking. Metacontingencies, according to Glenn (2004) whom Tourinho cites, are units of cultural selection that involve multiple behaviors organized around specific cultural practices. Tourinho argues that we need conceptual and methodological resources to analyze cognition from the standpoint of metacontingencies.

Ruiz argues that this approach, though promising in general direction, has a logical sequence problem. Without a precise functional definition of thinking as derived relational behavior, it is difficult to know exactly what is being analyzed in the metacontingencies. Ruiz maintains that RFT provides precisely such a functional definition: thinking as relational behavior that emerges from the individual's learning history in the context of specific cultural practices. Once one has this clear definition, then it becomes possible to proceed to the analysis of metacontingencies, as Tourinho proposes.

In essence, Ruiz proposes that the correct sequence is: (1) begin with a functional definition of language and cognition based on RFT; (2) use that definition to identify and analyze the basic behavioral processes involved; (3) once these basic processes are understood, proceed to the analysis of cultural practices and metacontingencies as Tourinho suggests.

Ruiz notes that the absence in Tourinho's article of a clear specification of what is meant by "thinking" is problematic. Without such clarification, it is difficult to determine which aspects of behavior are relevant to metacontingential analysis and how to identify the appropriate units of cultural analysis. Ruiz sees this as a practical problem, not merely a theoretical one: without a clear functional definition, one cannot proceed systematically to analyze the cultural practices that Tourinho correctly identifies as fundamental.

Implications

The implications of Ruiz's commentary suggest that a fruitful integration of the three research programs that both authors acknowledge (Skinnerian verbal behavior, derived relational behavior, and cultural selection) requires a careful sequence of theoretical development. A solid foundation must first be established in basic processes (RFT), and then proceed to more complex analyses of cultural systems.

The implications also suggest that Tourinho's proposal, although valuable, needs to be complemented with a precise functional analysis of thinking. Only then will it be possible to identify exactly which behaviors and practices are relevant to a rigorous metacontingential analysis of thinking.

Significance and contribution

Ruiz's main contribution is to provide a constructive critique that clarifies the necessity of sequence in the theoretical analysis of thinking. By insisting that a precise functional definition of thinking based on RFT must precede the analysis of cultural metacontingencies, Ruiz provides a framework for integrating Tourinho's perspectives more effectively. Furthermore, by urging Tourinho to specify what he means by "thinking," Ruiz contributes to raising the level of conceptual precision necessary for an analysis of cultural practices to be rigorous and scientifically productive.