Comentario al artículo de R. Pérez‑Almonacid: El análisis del pensamiento humano

Full reference: Ruiz, F. J. (2012). Comentario al artículo de R. Pérez-Almonacid: El análisis del pensamiento humano [Comment on R. Pérez-Almonacid's article: The analysis of human thinking]. Acta Comportamentalia, 20(Monográfico), 69-72.

Type of work: Commentary (Theoretical response article to a conceptual contribution)

Central thesis and objectives

Francisco J. Ruiz presents a critical and constructive commentary on Pérez-Almonacid's article concerning the analysis of human thinking from the behavior analysis perspective. Ruiz's purpose is to critically analyze Pérez-Almonacid's proposal, which critiques analyses of thinking conducted from both the Skinnerian perspective and Relational Frame Theory (RFT). Ruiz acknowledges the validity of some of Pérez-Almonacid's arguments but identifies fundamental methodological problems in the critique: specifically, that Pérez-Almonacid adopts pre-analytic objectives different from those of other approaches and then attempts to judge them by his own standards, which is logically inconsistent.

Ruiz's central thesis is that the evaluation of any scientific approach must be conducted solely in terms of whether it achieves its own declared pre-analytic objectives. Therefore, Pérez-Almonacid cannot validly criticize Skinner or RFT from his own assumptions, nor can Skinner or RFT validly criticize Pérez-Almonacid from theirs. Ruiz maintains that each approach must be evaluated according to whether it succeeds in attaining the objectives it has set for itself.

Theoretical framework

Ruiz grounds his analysis in a clear conception of the nature of pre-analytic objectives in science. Citing Pepper (1942), Ruiz notes that pre-analytic objectives precede the analysis itself and that every scientific approach must make them explicit in order to verify whether it is conducting a successful analysis of its object of study. Pre-analytic objectives function as the criteria against which the success or failure of a theory or approach is judged.

Ruiz identifies that the Skinnerian approach and RFT have as pre-analytic objectives the prediction and influence (or control) of psychological events. By contrast, Pérez-Almonacid proposes as the main objective the description of the functional structure of behavior, its components, and relevant parameters. These are qualitatively distinct objectives that mark different starting and ending points for each approach. Ruiz's theoretical framework emphasizes that the plurality of pre-analytic objectives makes direct comparisons between approaches problematic from a logical standpoint.

Argument development

Ruiz develops his argument in three main moments. First, he articulates the principle of pre-analytic objectives. Ruiz underscores that since the different approaches have different starting points and endings, it is not possible to conduct a comparison of one approach from the viewpoint of another. The only coherent way to conduct a critique of a given approach is to analyze whether it fulfills its stated pre-analytic objectives. This establishes a meta-theoretical foundation for all subsequent evaluation.

Second, Ruiz conducts a detailed analysis of the critiques Pérez-Almonacid formulates against RFT. He specifically examines Pérez-Almonacid's criticism concerning the allegedly confusing character of contextual cues in RFT. Pérez-Almonacid notes that contextual cues can be diverse (nonverbal environmental characteristics, matching-to-sample procedures, verbal segments, words) and questions how something not present in the physical environment can function as a discriminative stimulus. Ruiz responds by arguing that Pérez-Almonacid incorrectly assumes that contextual cues must appear in the physical environment. RFT, Ruiz maintains, argues that context is composed not only of the physical environment but also of the individual's history. This history, although not observable at the moment of solving an analogy, is psychologically present for the subject.

Ruiz also notes that the diversity of modalities of contextual cues represents no conceptual confusion. The contextual cue is not defined by its form but by the individual's history of interactions with the context. Multiple stimuli with different forms can function as contextual cues if the individual has had a learning history that made this possible. Ruiz cites experimental evidence (Tonneau, Arreola, and Martínez, 2006) showing that RFT findings replicate with Pavlovian procedures in which the contextual cue apparently is not present but nevertheless remains psychologically present as a result of pre-experimental history.

Third, Ruiz addresses Pérez-Almonacid's accusation that research derived from RFT reduces to replicating effects of relation derivation and function transformation. Ruiz counters that RFT research is considerably richer and spans multiple areas: implicit cognition (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010), analysis of verbal regulation and self-formation (Luciano, Valdivia-Salas, and Ruiz, 2012), psychological intervention (Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson, 1999; Luciano et al., 2011), and training in derived relational behavior (Cassidy, Roche, and Hayes, 2011; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, and Smeets, 2004). He notes that studies of relational frame training specifically contradict Pérez-Almonacid's claim about the impossibility of people abstracting relations as operable concepts.

Finally, Ruiz acknowledges the promising potential of Pérez-Almonacid's starting point but asks him to develop his proposal with greater depth and to offer clear examples of how his approach would address various phenomena of human thinking (such as analogy). He also urges Pérez-Almonacid to clarify the relationship between his main objective (characterizing the functional structure of thinking) and the technology that might derive from such an approach, especially considering that other psychological perspectives with pre-analytic objectives different from prediction and control (such as cognitivism) have shown significant difficulties in identifying modifiable variables.

Implications

The implications of Ruiz's commentary are fundamental for research methodology in behavior analysis. First, it suggests that researchers must be careful when criticizing alternative approaches, ensuring they are using evaluation criteria appropriate to the theoretical framework they are criticizing. A valid critique must address whether the approach achieves its own declared objectives, not whether it attains different objectives one might prefer.

Second, Ruiz's commentary implies that the plurality of pre-analytic objectives in scientific psychology is not necessarily problematic; it is an expected feature of a mature science with multiple theoretical approaches. What matters is that each approach be transparent about its objectives and that its success be evaluated appropriately.

Significance and contribution

Ruiz's main contribution is to establish a solid meta-theoretical foundation for critically evaluating theoretical proposals in behavior analysis. By insisting on the importance of pre-analytic objectives and the necessity of evaluating approaches according to their own criteria, Ruiz provides a methodological principle that prevents logically invalid comparisons and promotes more rigorous and constructive debate among different perspectives within behavior analysis. This commentary reinforces the validity of RFT as a viable scientific approach while acknowledging the potential legitimacy of other approaches that pursue different objectives.